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Acquisitions of Pennsylvania Bank
Holding Companies-Who Determines
What Is Best for the Community?
I.

Introduction

Have you ever been to a hockey game at the First Union
Center in Philadelphia? Do you expect that you may someday take
in a Sunday afternoon baseball game at PNC Park on the north
side of Pittsburgh? While banks have sought to increase their
commercial exposure by displaying their names on Pennsylvania
sports arenas, for many of the Commonwealth's citizens, and
Americans as a whole, banking plays a much larger role in daily life
beyond that of sponsoring popular sporting events. Its historical
importance has prompted the Supreme Court to note that banking
is of a profound concern to local communities throughout the
United States.1 Despite this profound local importance however,
Congress appears to believe that the communities' interests are best
advanced when policy decisions are made at the federal level.
In the 1990s, Congress has taken measures to promote
interstate bank holding company acquisitions. Changes in federal
law, such as the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Act of 19942 (IBBEA), have sought to increase the
likelihood that bank holding company acquisitions will occur.
Congress hoped to achieve its goal through the repeal of federal
legislation that provided the states with the authority to govern the
terms under which bank holding company acquisitions would
occur.3 The rapid response to Congressional policy is evident by

1. See Northeast Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys., 472
U.S. 159, 177 (1985) (citing Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980)).
2. Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 101, 108 Stat. 2339, 2339-2381 (1994).
3. See Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 LEGIS. 255, 269
(1995).
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the increase
of acquisition activity in the banking field in recent
4

years.

The banking environment in Pennsylvania has not been
sheltered from the spur of acquisition activity. One of Pennsylvania's largest banking concerns, Philadelphia-based Corestates
Financial, was acquired by North Carolina's First Union in April of

1998.' Following First Union's acquisition of Corestates, Pennsylvania, once home to three large banking concerns, now harbors
only two.6 The acquisition of Corestates, along with a recent bid
from the Bank of New York for Mellon7 provides evidence of the
uncertain future of Pennsylvania bank holding companies. Even

though Bank of New York was ultimately unsuccessful in its
attempt to acquire Mellon in the spring of 1998, many analysts
consider Mellon to remain a probable target of further acquisition

plans.8
While federal legislation promotes the banking atmosphere of
the 1990's, some in Pennsylvania's legislature appear to disapprove

of the current trend. In the 182nd Assembly, the Pennsylvania
Senate passed legislation that would require State Banking

Department approval for any acquisition of a Pennsylvania bank
holding company with assets of ten billion dollars.9 Despite its

questionable validity in light of Congressional amendments to the
Federal Bank Holding Company Act'0 however, the amended
version of the bill died in the House."

4. See Lee Meyerson & Maripat Alpuche, Structural Defenses to Unsolicited Takeover
Offers and Bids in the Banking Industry, 922 P.L.I./CORP. 77, 79 (1996).
5. See Acquisition is Completed of Corestates Financial,WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1998, at
B4.
6. See 36 PA. LEGIS. J.-S. 2050, 2052-54, 182nd Legis. Sess. (June 8, 1998) (senate
debate discussing the need for legislation to protect Pennsylvania's largest bank holding
companies from hostile takeovers). The two largest Pennsylvania bank holding companies
are Mellon Bank Corp. and PNC Bank Corp. See id.
7. See Patricia Sabatini, Spurned Suitor Ends Bid for Mellon: Bank of New York Never
Got to Bargain$23 Billion Offer, PITTSBURGH POST GAZ., May 21, 1998, at Al.
8. See Matt Murray & Stephen E. Frank, Bank of New York Withdraws Its Bid for
Mellon, THE WALL ST. J., May 21 1998, at A3; see also Arnold G. Danielson, National
Trends In Banking: The Battle for Supremacy, 17 No. 2 BANKING POL'Y REP. 1, 12 (1998)
(listing Mellon as a logical bank target).
9. See 36 PA. LEGIS. J.-S. 2050, 2056, 182nd Legis. Sess. (June 8, 1998). The amended
version of the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 43 for and 5 opposed. See id.
10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994).
11. See H.R. 1479, 182nd Legis. (Pa. 1998). The bill died at the close of the 182nd
Assembly.
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The proponents of the failed legislation need not fret however,
Pennsylvania's business corporation laws may already provide that
the Commonwealth's interests will not go unheard when a predator
from outside the Commonwealth's borders appears positioned to
pounce upon a Pennsylvania bank holding company. 2 One of the
provisions passed pursuant to Pennsylvania's stringent fourthgeneration antitakeover legislation involved refining Pennsylvania's
definition of fiduciary duty.'3 Pennsylvania's fiduciary duty law
expressly allows boards of directors to exercise their duties and
make decisions based on the interests of the communities in which
the corporations conduct operations. 4
Congress however, does not appear to share Pennsylvania's
trust in directors of corporations to consider the needs of the
community, at least not in the banking area. Under the Bank
Holding Company Act, Congress has given regulatory authority
over acquisitions of bank holding companies to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board. 5 Under the federal
legislative scheme, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board, not the boards of directors of bank holding companies, is
entrusted with the task of protecting community interests and the
public welfare in the event of a bank holding company acquisition. 6
When a Pennsylvania bank holding company finds itself a
target of a hostile takeover attempt, may Pennsylvania allow the
board of directors to assess the needs of the community and take
actions on its behalf, the task to which Congress has delegated
responsibility for the Federal Reserve Board? In an effort to
answer this question, Part II reviews federal legislation providing

12. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a) (West 1995). Pennsylvania's antitakeover
legislation provides significant protection from hostile takeover attempts to the Commonwealth's bank holding companies. See Murry & Frank, supra note 8, at A3 (noting the
difficulty Bank of New York would face in attempting a hostile takeover of Mellon); see also
Gary M. Holihan, Note, Pennsylvania'sAntitakeover Statute: An Impermissible Regulation
of the Interstate Marketfor CorporateControl,66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 863, 863 (1992) (calling
Pennsylvania's antitakeover legislation the "nation's toughest antitakeover statute").
13. See Gary M. Holihan, supra note 12, at 883. Under Pennsylvania's most recent
antitakeover legislation, when faced with a potential takeover situation boards of directors
may consider factors other than shareholder profit. See id; see also title 15, § 1715.
14. See title 15, § 1715(a)(1).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1994).
16. See id. § 1842(c)(2); see also S. REP. No. 1095, at 10 (1955), reprinted in 1956
U.S.S.C.A.N. 2482, 2491-92 (discussing how Federal Reserve Board regulation would ensure
that the expansion of bank holding companies "would be regulated in the public interest").
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for regulation of bank holding companies, Part III discusses
Pennsylvania's fiduciary law, and Part IV considers the question of
federal preemption.
II.

Bank Holding Company Regulation: Protecting Community
Interests

Nationally chartered banks are created and governed primarily
by the National Bank Act.17 Bank holding companies however,
are governed by the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) 8

"Bank holding company" is defined in the BHCA as "any company
which has control over any bank."' 9 A bank holding company
may be organized as a corporation, partnership, business trust,
association, or any other similar organization.' Two of Pennsylvania's largest bank
holding companies are organized as Pennsylva21
nia corporations.
A company has control over a bank when the company: (1)
directly or indirectly controls, or has the power to vote more than

25% of any class of securities of a bank;22 (2) the company
controls the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of a
bank;23 or (3) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board determines that a company exercises a controlling influence
over a bank.2
While mergers, consolidations, and other acquisitions of

national banks are subject to the approval of the Comptroller of
the Currency,25 under the Bank Holding Company Act like

17. See id. §§ 21-216.
18. See id. §§ 1841-1850.
19. Id. § 1841(a)(1). The definition of "bank" includes
(A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act [12 U.S.C. 1813(h)]
(B) An institution organized under the laws of the United States ...which both
(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by
check or similar means for payment to third parties or others; and
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (1994 & supp. 11 1996). The Act also includes exceptions from the
definition of "bank" excluding certain designated organizations. See id. § 1841(c)(2).
20. See id. § 1841(b).
21. See S.E.C. filing 10-Q, Mellon Bank Corp. (May 5, 1997); see also S.E.C. filing 10K/A PNC Bank Corp. (June 24, 1998).
22. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2)(A) (1994).
23. See id. § 1841(a)(2)(B).
24. See id. § 1841(a)(2)(C).
25. See id. §§ 215a, 215b, 215c (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
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transactions involving bank holding companies must receive
authorization from the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.26
According to the legislative history of the Bank Holding Company
Act, because of the importance of banking to the nation, Congress
requires Federal Reserve Board regulation of bank holding
companies in order to protect the public welfare.27 Section 1842
of the Bank Holding Company Act provides that
It shall be unlawful, except with the prior approval of the
Board(l) for any action to be taken that causes any company to
become a bank holding company; (2) for any action to be taken
that causes a bank to become a subsidiary of a bank holding
company; (3) for any bank holding company to acquire direct
or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any
bank if, after such acquisition, such a company will directly or
indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting
shares of such bank; (4) for any bank holding company or
subsidiary thereof, other than a bank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank; or (5) for any bank holding
company to merge or consolidate with any other bank holding
company.2
Basically, any action that would have the effect of creation, merger,
consolidation, or acquisition of a bank holding company must first
receive the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board.29 Of particular relevance in a hostile takeover
situation is part three, which requires Board approval for any
transaction that would allow an acquiror to gain, whether directly
or indirectly, more than 5% of the voting shares of a bank.3"
The BCHA emphasizes the Board of Governor's role in
protecting the public welfare when evaluating an application for a
transaction of the type enumerated in section 1842.31 In passing
the BCHA, Congress established several factors, concentrating
primarily on the proposed action's potential impact on the relevant
community, that the Board of Governors must consider when

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
(1955),

See id. § 1842.
See S. REP. No. 1095, at 10 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2491.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1994).
See id.
See id. § 1842(a)(3).
See id. §§ 1842(c)(1)(B), 1842(c)(2), & 1842(d)(3); see also S. REP. NO. 1095, at 10
reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2491.
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judging an application.3 2 For example, the Board is not to
approve any proposal that may have the effect of substantially
lessening competition in any section of the country unless the
benefits to the convenience and needs of the community clearly
outweigh any anticompetitive effects of the proposal. 33 Furthermore, the Board must take into consideration the applicant's record
of compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act.34 Under
this requirement, the Board must consider the applicant's record of
meeting the credit needs of the community,
including those of low
35
and moderate income neighborhoods.
The BHCA also provides that the Board of Governors must
take into consideration community factors throughout its decision
making process. 36 In every case, the Board must consider "the
convenience and needs of the community to be served. ' 37 Thus,
the Board may not approve an application without considering the
interests of the community involved.
The legislative history of the BCHA indicates that Congress
was concerned about the development of bank holding companies
and the impact their expansion may have on the nation.3" In
passing the BCHA, Congress sought to alleviate its fear by
delegating to the Federal Reserve Board the responsibility of

32. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1994). The Board must also consider the applicant's
ability to provide information the Board may find appropriate in its consideration of the
application. See id. § 1842(c)(3). If the applicant does not provide the Board with adequate
assurances that the applicant will provide information that the Board may find appropriate
in order to enforce compliance with the other factors, the Board shall not approve the
application. See id. § 1842(c)(3)(A). The Board must also consider the management
capabilities of the applicant. See id. § 1842(c)(2). For further elaboration of the evaluation
criteria used by the Board of Governors when considering an application, see Federal
Reserve Board Regulation Y.
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1)(B) (1994). The Board is also not to approve any
proposal that would have the effect of creating a monopoly or further any attempt at creating
a monopoly in any part of the United States. See id. § 1842(c)(1)(A).
34. See id. § 1842(d)(3).
35. See id. § 1842(d)(3)(A) (stating that the Board must comply with its responsibilities
under section 2903). Section 2903 of the Community Reinvestment Act states in part that
In connection with its examination of a financial institution, the appropriate
Federal financial supervisor agency shall
(1) assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire
community, including low- and moderate income neighborhoods consistent
with the safe and sound operation of such institution;
Id. § 2903(a) (1994).
36. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1994).
37. Id.
38. See S.REP. No. 1095, at 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2483.

1999]

PENNSYLVANIA BANK HOLDING COMPANIES

protecting the public interest.39 Initially however, the states were
left with a share of the responsibility.
A. The Douglass Amendment
Prior to 1994, the Bank Holding Company Act required the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board to defer to state
law when considering an application for a transaction of the type
listed in section 1842.40 Following the passage of the Douglas
Amendment, the Board's decision upon evaluating an application
depended, at least in part, on the laws of the home state of the
target of the applicant.4 1 The Amendment prohibited interstate
acquisition of any voting shares, interests, or all or substantially all
of the assets of a bank by a bank holding company unless such

action was explicitly authorized by the state where the bank was
located.42 Thus, unless the proposed transaction was authorized by
laws of the home state of the target bank, the Board could not
approve an application. 43 As a result of the Amendment, inter-

state banking acquisitions were often barred by state legislation.'
Eventually some state legislatures began to permit interstate45
banking subject to certain regional and reciprocity requirements.
Under these arrangements, states would allow holding companies
of only specifically designated states to acquire banks within their

state, and for some, only so long as the home state of the foreign

39. See id. at 9-11.
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988), amended by, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1994).
41. See id.
42. See id. The Douglas Amendment read in pertinent part that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no application (except an
application filed as a result of a transaction authorized under section 1823(f) of
this title) shall be approved under this section which will permit any bank holding
company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting
shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any additional bank
located outside of the State in which the operations of such bank holding
company's banking subsidiaries were principally conducted on July, 1966, or the
date on which such company became a bank holding company, whichever is later,
unless the acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-state
bank holding company is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State
in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by
implication.
Id.
43. See id.
44. See Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 3, at 258.
45. See id.
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holding company allowed similar treatment to the bank holding
companies of their state.' The Supreme Court validated these
state regional and reciprocity laws in Northeast Bancorp v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 The Court found

that in light of the Douglass Amendment, such state legislative
schemes were of the type contemplated by Congress.48 Moreover,
the Court determined that the laws in question were consistent with
the broader purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act to "retain
local, community-based control over banking., 49 Prior to 1995,
similar legislation existed in Pennsylvania." Nearly a decade after
the Supreme Court's validation of the legislation however, Congress
changed its attitude toward regional banking.
B. The Interstate Branching and Banking Efficiency Act of 1994

In the 1990's, some members of Congress began to express
concerns with the banking system that had developed as a result of
the varying state laws.51 The fragmented system in the United
States contrasted sharply with the banking systems of other major
financial countries such as those in Canada, Japan, and the
countries of Europe.52 Former Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
referred 53to the country's "patchwork system" of banking as
"clumsy."
While many states had moved toward a greater
acceptance of interstate bank holding company acquisitions, the
variations in laws and regulations at the state level permitted
interstate banking only in an inefficient and high cost manner. 4
In response to concerns about the efficiency of the banking system
in the United States, Congress passed the Interstate Branching and
Banking Efficiency Act of 1994. 5' With the passage of the
Interstate Branching and Banking Efficiency Act (IBBEA),

46. See id.
47. 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
48. See id. at 172.
49. Id. at 173.
50. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 115, 116 (West 1995), amended by PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
7, § 115 (West supp. 1998). The current statute contains no regional or
reciprocity on bank acquisitions within the Commonwealth. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 115.
51. See S. REP. No. 103-240, at 3, 4 (1994).
52. See id. at 4.
53. Id. at 10 (quoting Secretary Bensen).
54. See id. (quoting former Federal Reserve Board Governor John LaWare's testimony
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on October 5, 1993).
55. See generally id.
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Congress sought to reduce state control over interstate banking
acquisitions.56
One of the more substantial changes introduced by the passage
of the IBBEA was the repeal of the Douglass Amendment.
Section 1842(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act now provides
that, so long as an applicant bank holding company is adequately

capitalized and managed, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board may approve an application "to acquire control of,
or acquire all or substantially all of the assets of, a bank located in
a State other than the home State or such bank holding company,
without regard to whether such transaction is prohibited under the
law of any State., 57 Thus, the IBBEA withdrew the state's
permission under the Douglas Amendment to decide if and how
interstate bank acquisitions would occur.58
The legislative history reveals that in passing the Interstate
Branching and Banking Act, Congress sought to achieve benefits

aimed toward creating additional consumer convenience and
choices59 and increase banks' ability to diversify risks through
exposure to varying economic regions, thus lowering the possibility
of bank failure and subsequent Federal government bailout.' In
allowing the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to judge
applications for interstate bank holding company acquisitions

56. See S. REP. No. 103-240, at 10 (1994).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (1994).
58. The IBBEA does however, enumerate certain areas where the Board of Governors
must defer to state legislation. A host state may provide for a minimum amount of time that
its banks be in existence before they may be acquired by an out-of-state bank holding
company, see id. § 1842(d)(1)(B)(i), however the Federal Reserve Board may approve an
acquisition of a bank that has been in existence for at least five years without regard to any
state law requiring a longer period of time. See id. § 1842(d)(1)(B)(ii). Furthermore, state
legislation requiring that a certain portion of bank assets be made available to statesponsored housing entities is unaffected by the passage of the IBBEA, so long as the state
requirements are not discriminatory, and were in effect prior to September 29, 1994. See id.
§ 1842(d)(1)(D). The Act specifically provides that it will have no effect on a state's ability
to limit the percentage total amount of deposits of an insured depository institution held or
controlled by any bank, bank holding company, or any of its affiliates, in the given state, to
the extent such limitations are not discriminatory to out of-state banks, bank holding
companies, or subsidiaries thereof. See id. § 1842(d)(2)(C). In addition, the Board must also
be mindful of statewide concentration limits when applicant's are seeking an initial entry into
a given state. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(B) (1994). While Congress has expressly preserved
some areas where state legislation may govern the outcome of the decision of the Board of
Governors, the authority preserved by the IBBEA is nonetheless minimal compared to the
control the states possessed under the Douglass Amendment.
59. See S. REP. No. 103-240, at 12.
60. See id.
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without regard to state law, the legislative history indicates that
Congress felt the IBBEA would promote a banking environment

that would better serve the community by fostering wider choices
and better prices for consumers.61
In passing the IBBEA, Congress seems to have implied that
varying state laws pertaining to the development of bank holding

companies have not efficiently advanced the public interest.
Despite Congressional action however, Pennsylvania appears
unwilling to accept the proposition that the communities interest is
sufficiently protected by the Federal Reserve Board.
III. Exercising Fiduciary Duty: Considering the Interests of the

Community
As Congress has delegated the authority to consider the

interests of the community, so too has the Pennsylvania legislature.
While federal legislation gives the duty of protecting the interests
of the public to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board,6 2 Pennsylvania's legislature has given its corporations the

authority to exercise their duties in the interest of the community.63 Pennsylvania legislation permits boards of directors of
Pennsylvania bank holding companies registered as Pennsylvania
corporations to make decisions based on community interests. 64
Section 1715 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporations Law

states that boards of directors, committees of the board, and
individual directors, in the discharge of their duties may consider
"[t]he effects of any action upon the communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation are located." 65 While

61. See id. (quoting April 23,1991 testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan).
62. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(c)(2) & 1842(d)(3) (1994).
63. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 1995) (authorizing directors of
corporations to consider interests of the community upon exercise of their duties).
64. See id.
65. Id. The entire section states that boards of directors, committees of the board, and
individual directors, in the discharge of their duties, may consider
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action,
including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the
corporation, and upon the communities in which offices or other establishments
of the corporation are located.
Id. Pennsylvania law also allows directors to consider the short and long terms interests of
the corporation, see id. § 1715(a)(2), the "resources, intent and conduct" of any person
attempting to acquire control of the corporation, title 15, § 1715(a)(3), and "all other
pertinent factors." Id. § 1715(a)(4). A shareholders group challenged the constitutionality
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boards of directors, committees, and individual directors may of

course consider the interests of the shareholders, they need not
consider "the interests of any particular group affected ...

dominant or controlling interest or

factor." 66

as a

Thus, boards of

directors, committees of the board, and individual directors of bank

holding companies registered as Pennsylvania corporations are
expressly permitted to consider and adopt policies based on
interests beyond those of the shareholders. 67 Therefore, when
faced with a takeover attempt, the board of a Pennsylvania bank

holding company may take action, even if it has the effect of
reducing share value, and justify its decision on the interests of the

community.
The Pennsylvania law provides further protection for boards
of directors who choose to base decisions on interests other than
those of the shareholders. 68 The law creates a presumption that,
absent a breach of fiduciary duty, lack or good faith or self-dealing,
any action by the board, a committee of the board, or individual
director is in the best interest of the corporation.6 9 Pennsylvania

law provides the directors with an even greater amount of protection from disgruntled shareholders when the board is defending
against a hostile takeover attempt.7" In order to succeed on any
claim challenging a decision of the majority of the disinterested
directors,71 which relates to or affects "an acquisition or potential
of this statute, along with the other portions of Pennsylvania's antitakeover legislation in
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1992). The court
determined that the claims were not ripe for review. See id.
66. Title 15, § 1715(b).
67. See id.
68. See id. § 1715(d).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. "Disinterested director" is defined in section 1715 as
(1) A director of the corporation other than:
(i) A director who has a direct or indirect financial or other interest in the
person acquiring or seeking to acquire control of the corporation or who is
an affiliate or associate..., or was nominated or designated as a director by,
a person acquiring or seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
(ii) Depending on the specific facts surrounding the director and the act
under consideration, an officer or employee or former officer or employee
of the corporation.
Title 15, § 1715(e)(1). A person is not considered to be other than a disinterested director
solely by owning shares of the corporation, receiving a distribution made to holders of shares
of the corporation, the receipt of consideration or right to retirement compensation for
serving as a director, any interests a director may have in retaining their status as director,
See id.
or any former business or employment relationship with the corporation.
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or proposed acquisition of control,"M an opponent of the board
must establish by "clear and convincing evidence, 73 that the
directors did not act in good faith.74
When presented with an acquisition offer, the board of a bank
holding company may choose to reject proposal, citing to the
interests and needs of the community as justification for its
action. 75 A rejection leaves the would-be acquiror to decide
between abandoning the offer or proceeding to mount an assuredly
costly hostile takeover attempt. If the would-be acquiror decides
to proceed with a hostile takeover attempt, the acquiror must
obtain approval from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board if the acquiror will obtain more than 5% of the
voting shares of any bank through acquiring ownership in the bank
holding company.76 The Board of Governors then, in deciding
whether to approve the application, must consider consummation
of the proposal
in light of the needs and convenience of the
77
community.
The board of directors of a target bank holding company,
when opposed to any acquisition attempt, may choose to adopt
policies to prevent the takeover from succeeding. The board of
directors may cite as justification for those actions a factor the
Board of Governors must too consider: the interests of the
community that would be affected by consummation of the
takeover attempt.7' Thus, in situation involving a hostile takeover
attempt of a Pennsylvania bank holding company, both the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board and the board of
directors of the target corporation may be basing their decisions, in
part, on the needs of the community involved. 79 The legislative
scheme allows for the possibility that the Board of Governors and
§ 1715(d)(2).
72. Id. § 1715(d).
73. Id.
74. See id.; see also Michael S.Marshall, Comment, Beyond the Third Generation:An
Analysis of Pennsylvania's Latest Attack on Hostile Takeovers, 29 DUO. L. REv. 579, 582
(1991) ("Arguably, the legislature has granted directors a blank check when a takeover
attempt looms on the horizon").
75. Mellon's board of directors cited the interests of the community as among factors
it considered in deciding to reject The Bank of New York's April 1998 unsolicited bid. See
Bank Scuttles Move for Deal to Buy Mellon, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, May 21, 1998, at Bll.
76. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1994).
77. See id. § 1842(c)(2).
78. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (West 1995).
79. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2); see also title 15, § 1715(a)(1).
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the board of directors of a target Pennsylvania bank holding
company will disagree as to whether the proposed acquisition is in
the best interest of the relevant communities.
Can the Pennsylvania legislature allow boards of directors of
holding companies to make decisions based on the needs of the
community, even if the Board of Governors disagrees with the
directors' determinations concerning the impact a proposed
acquisition would have on the relevant community? Or does the
Federal Bank Holding Company Act prevent Pennsylvania from
allowing boards of directors of corporations registered in the
Commonwealth from making such determinations when the
corporation is a bank holding company? The next section will
explore whether federal law preempts Pennsylvania's fiduciary duty
statute as it applies to bank holding companies.
IV. Preemption Analysis
Federal preemptive authority is based on the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.' ° Article VI states that
"[T]he Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land ...."81 Following the principle first expressed in
McCulloch v. Maryland,' more recent decisions have stated that
"it has been settled" that state law that conflicts with federal
legislation is "without effect."8 3
Analysis of federal preemption of state action begins with the
presumption that state law is not superseded when the state is
The Supreme Court has
exercising its traditional powers.'
declared that " '[w]e will interpret a statute to pre-empt the traditional state powers only if that result is 'the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.' "'
In the United States, individual states have traditionally had
the power to charter corporations,' and therefore have possessed
the power to define how those corporations are governed.'
80. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 405-06 (1819).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2.
82. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316.
83. Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
84. See Dept. of Revenue of Oregon v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994).
85. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
86. See DETLEV F. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 2, (3d ed. 1989); see also Chicago
Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 124-25 (1937).
87. See Chicago Title and Trust, 302 U.S. at 124-25.
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According the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. BT Investment
Managers,88 that the same authority exists where the corporation
is a bank holding company, an entity that has received a great deal
of attention from Congress. In a decision considering the power of
state regulation over bank holding companies in light of the Bank
Holding Company Act, the Supreme Court stated that "as a matter
of history ...

banking and related financial activities are of

profound local concern.', 89 Therefore, as is the case with any
traditional state power, the preemption analysis begins with the
assumption that Pennsylvania has the authority to define the
standard by which directors of bank holding companies chartered
within the Commonwealth exercise their duties.
The intention of Congress is the "ultimate touchstone" for
analyzing the preemptive effect of federal law.9" Congressional
intent may be (1) expressed in the language of the statute, or (2)
implicit in the structure and purpose of the legislation. 9 The
Bank Holding Company Act contains no provision expressly stating
that only the Board of Governors may consider community needs
when evaluating the potential effects of a bank holding company
acquisition. Thus, if Congress has preempted the states from
allowing directors of bank holding companies to consider the same
factors the Board of Governors must consider, it must have done
so implicitly.
The Supreme Court has applies two tests for determining the
existence of implicit preemption.92 State law is implicitly preempted by federal law if the (1) federal law " 'so thoroughly occupies a
legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for states to supplement it' "9 or (2) state law
actually conflicts with federal law.94 The BHCA itself contemplates certain areas where the states may act in ways that affect
bank holding company acquisitions, 95 thus federal law does not so
thoroughly occupy the field such that a state may not supplement
it with its own legislation. Therefore, in order for implicit preemp88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
(1982)).
94.
95.

447 U.S. 27 (1980).
Id. at 38.
Cippollone v. Ligget Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
See id.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(B) & (D) (1994).
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tion to exist, the provisions of Pennsylvania's fiduciary duty statute
must actually conflict with the BHCA.
The Supreme Court has stated that an actual conflict between
state and federal laws exists when the state law " 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' "96 The legislative history of the
Bank Holding Company Act states that "public welfare requires
the enactment of legislation providing Federal regulation of the
growth of bank holding companies . . . ."' According to the
Senate Committee Report, the importance of banking to the
national economy required Congress to provide for federal
regulation of bank holding companies.9 8 In weighing various
factors designated by Congress, which include the convenience,
needs and welfare of the community, Congress contemplated that
Federal Reserve Board regulation would provide that consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions "would be regulated in the public
interest." 99 While the BHCA contains nothing expressly addressing the decision-making process of boards of directors of bank
holding companies, Congress has, according to the legislative
history, given the Federal Reserve Board the responsibility of
protecting the° public welfare in the field of bank holding company
acquisitions."
In addition, in light of the Interstate Branching and Banking
Act of 1994, Congress appears to prefer that the states play a
minimal role in making policy decisions governing bank holding
company acquisitions. The Senate Committee Report on the
Interstate Branching and Banking Act of 1994 states that one of
the purposes of the amendments to the Bank Holding Company
Act made pursuant to the IBBEA is to "eliminate remaining
disharmonious local law restrictions on interstate bank holding
company acquisitions of banks in different states" in order to

96. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987) (quoting Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). An actual conflict may
also exist where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility .... Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963). No such conflict exists between the BCHA and the Pennsylvania fiduciary duty law
because both the Board of Governors and the boards of directors could agree. There is "no
inevitable collision" between the federal and Pennsylvania laws. See id. at 143.
97. S.REP. No. 1095, at 1 (1955), reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2482.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 10.
100. See id.
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reduce the barriers to interstate banking. 1 ' The legislative
history indicates that in passing the IBBEA, Congress contemplated
10 2
restricting state control over interstate bank acquisitions.
By giving the power to make decisions for the community to
boards of directors of corporations, the Pennsylvania law has the
potential to create a barrier to the purpose of Congress to
eliminate the "disharmonious local law restrictions on interstate
bank holding company acquisitions .... ""' Furthermore, Pennsylvania allows boards of directors to adopt policies and make
determinations for the community, a practice that, if done by a
state body concerning a bank holding company acquisition, would
be disregarded by the Federal Reserve Board. °
When Congress enacted the IBBEA in 1994, Pennsylvania's
current fiduciary duty statute was in effect. 0 5 There is no mention of state corporation laws or their impact on potential bank
holding company acquisitions in the history of the IBBEA. Thus,
it appears that by passing the IBBEA, Congress was not concerned
with varying state corporation laws and the nonuniform impact they
may have on bank holding company acquisition attempts.
Congress' concern may have been only with ending direct state
legislation that restrained interstate
bank acquisitions, such as the
10 6
regional and reciprocity laws.
There is no evidence however, that Congress was aware of
Pennsylvania's fiduciary duty statute. Moreover, when considering
the preemptive effect of federal law, the Supreme Court is
"reluctant to draw inferences from Congress's failure to act. ' 10 7
Therefore, Congress' failure to address an issue is not determinative of its intent. 0 8

101. S. REP. NO. 103-240, at 10 (1994).
102. See id.
103. Id. Unlike those of most States, Pennsylvania's fiduciary duty law contains no
provision requiring boards of directors to consider shareholder interests the primary concern
upon an exercise of their duties. See Meyerson & Alpuche, supra note 4, at 117. Only
Indiana has enacted a similar law. See id.; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-351(d) & (f)
(Michie 1995).
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (d)(1)(A) (1994).
105. The current statute was enacted on December 19, 1990. See notes to 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1715 (West 1995).
106. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A); see also S. REP. NO. 103-240, at 10 (1994).
107. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306 (1988).
108. See id.
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Nonetheless, an expression by Congress addressing preemption, stated in the language of the statute, governs the statute's
preemptive scope.1"9 The Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen
Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority.

.

.' there is no

need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions. "'1
While the inclusion of an express
clause defining the preemptive reach of a federal statute does not

determine that implied preemption cannot exist,"' it may support
an inference that an express clause forecloses preemption.

2

Upon passage of the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956,
Congress included a section reserving the rights of states to govern

bank holding companies." 3 Despite the change in emphasis away
from state regulation in the IBBEA, Congress has left this
provision largely unchanged. 4 Section 1846 of the BHCA states

that "No provision of this chapter shall be construed as preventing
any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now
has or may hereafter have with respect to companies, banks, bank

holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof."' 1 5 With the inclusion of this section, the Supreme Court has determined that
"Congress' concern was to define the extent of the federal
legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law.""n 6 The Supreme
Court found that section 1846 preserves existing State powers."'
Therefore, because states have traditionally possessed the power to

109. See Cippollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517.
110. Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978)).
111. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-88 (1995).
112. See id. at 288.
113. See 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1994); see also S. REP. NO. 1095, at 22 (1955), reprinted in
1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2504.
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1846(b). The only substantial change was the addition of part b,
which provides that state taxation authority is not to be affected by the Bank Holding
Company Act. See id.
115. Id. § 1846(a).
116. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 49 (1980).
117. See id. State and federal courts have found that section 1846 ensured state power
to prohibit bank holding companies within their respective jurisdictions. See, e.g., Commercial Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 451 F.2d 86 (8th
Cit. 1971); see also Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First West Virginia Bancorp, Inc., 277
S.E.2d 613, 615 (W. Va. 1981).
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charter corporations," 8 and thus define how directors may exercise their fiduciary duty,"9 section 1846 appears to ensure that the
states maintain their authority over corporations, even if the
corporation is a bank holding company. While the Board of
Governors is given the responsibility to decide which acquisitions
will produce outcomes in accord with the needs and convenience
of the community,2 0 and Congress has recently enacted legislation that indicates an intention to severely limit state laws preventing interstate bank acquisitions,' 2' Congress has not indicated a
"clear and manifest" purpose to prevent States from allowing
boards of directors to consider the interests of the community in
the exercise of their duties.
Despite the apparent conflict that remains if Congress has not
preempted the Pennsylvania law, the two laws can be reconciled.
In the past, the Board of Governors has adopted a policy of
neutrality toward an acquisition planned to occur through hostile
means. 22 The Board has stated that under the Bank Holding
Company Act it must apply "the statutory criteria equally in the
case of applications supported by the management of the acquired
123
company as well as in those that are opposed by management.'
Thus, the Board of Governors may grant approval for a hostile
acquisition to occur, whether or not the hostile attempt is ultimately successful. 124 While the Board of Governors adopted its policy
of neutrality prior to the passage of the Interstate Branching and
Banking Act, 25 the Board's approach is still consistent with the
IBBEA. An amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act
replacing the Douglass Amendment, enacted as part of the IBBEA
states that "[t]he Board may approve an application ... without
regard to whether such transaction is prohibited under the law of

118. See VAGTS supra note 86; see also Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-Six Wilcox
Bldg. Corp. 302 U.S. 120, 124-52 (1937).
119. See Chicago Title and Trust, 302 U.S. at 124-25.
120. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2).
121. See S. REP. No. 103-240, at 10 (1994) (stating that one of the purposes of the
IBBEA is to eliminate local law restrictions on interstate bank holding company
acquisitions).
122. See Meyerson & Alpuche, supra note 4, at 81; see also The Bank of New York Co.,
Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 257, 259 (1988).
123. The Bank of New York Co., Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. at 259. The Board employs a
higher degree of scrutiny when considering an application in which the management of the
organization to be acquired opposes the application. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 257 (decision of the Board issued in 1988).
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any State."1" 6 Thus, the Board may perform its responsibilities
and fulfill its obligations while ignoring the Pennsylvania law and
the decisions made by the directors of the target bank holding
company.
The case remains that directors of Pennsylvania bank holding
companies may have the ability to second guess the decision of the
Board of Governors. The Board of Governors could approve an
application for an acquisition of a Pennsylvania bank holding
company only to have the management of the target bank holding
company succeed in avoiding the hostile attempt, and cite as
justification for their actions, at least in part, the needs of the
community, a factor the Board must have already considered.
Regardless of the possibility of this scenario, the Board of Governors maintains the ability to make the ultimate decision over
whether a bank holding company acquisition will occur. While the
directors of a target Pennsylvania bank holding company may
prevent consummation of an acquisition approved by the Board of
Governors, an acquisition, even if supported by the management,
cannot occur without the approval of the Board. Thus, the
Congressional policy favoring Federal Reserve Board regulation
over the expansion of bank holding companies remains fulfilled.
V.

Conclusion

The long list of factors that boards of directors are expressly
permitted to consider under Pennsylvania's fiduciary duty statute
may make the question of preemption largely academic. In
addition to permitting consideration of the interest of the community, Pennsylvania's fiduciary duty law allows directors, committees
of directors, and boards of directors to consider also the interests
of employees, suppliers, customers, creditors and "[a]ll other
pertinent factors" in the exercise of their duties. 27 Thus, even if
directors of Pennsylvania bank holding companies could not take
action based on the interests of the community, they would have a
seemingly endless variety of topics to choose from upon which they
may justify their decisions.
The fiduciary duty statute, unlike the legislation introduced in
the Assembly during the 182nd Session in 1998, does not ensure
that a Pennsylvania entity, whether public or private, will consider

126. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (1994).
127. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a) (West 1995).
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the needs of the Commonwealth's communities when considering
a takeover bid. However, even if the Pennsylvania legislature had
been successful in granting the State Banking Department the
authority to measure a proposed acquisition's impact on the
community and either prevent or allow consummation of the
proposal based on its determination, the bill would be of questionable validity at best in light of the IBBEA. 128 Nonetheless, the
proponents of the bill may find some consolation in the fact that
they may have escaped federal preemption by delegating the power
to make decisions for the future of the Commonwealth's communities to the boards of directors of the bank holding companies
chartered in the Commonwealth. Perhaps the legislature will
remain satisfied with trusting the boards of directors to protect and
promote community interests.
Despite statements from both Congress and the Pennsylvania
legislature regarding the special importance of banking in daily
life, 129 both governments allow the public at large to exercise very
minimal, if any, direct or indirect control over policy governing
bank holding company acquisitions and in determining which
proposals will further the interests of the community involved. 3 '
One vote the community does maintain though, comes not from the
ballot box, but from the checkbook, the wallet, and the savings
portfolio, and in making the ultimate determination as to which
banks serve the community best perhaps that is the vote that
matters most.
William M. Garrett

128. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (stating that the Board of Governors may approve
an application for an acquisition of an adequately capitalized and managed bank holding
company "without regard to whether such transaction is prohibited under the law of any
State").
129. See S. REP. No. 1095, at 1, 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2482, 2483;
see also 36 PA. LEGIS. J.-S. 2050, 2052, 182nd Legis. Sess. (June 8, 1998).
130. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board is composed of seven
members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the he Senate. See 12
U.S.C. § 241 (1994).

